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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1990-91rERM. 
Paul C. Giannelli ·~' 
Albert J. ·Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherh ad 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Univers ty' 
This article summarizes many of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's criminal law decisions of the last term. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Probable Cause Hearings 
In County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661 
(1991), the Supreme Court held that a 48-hour delay 
between the time of arrest and a hearing to determine 
probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In 
an earlier case, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the 
Court had held that the Fourth Amendment required a 
"prompt" judicial determination of probable cause if a 
person is arrested without a warrant. McLaughlin 
involved a class action challenging the manner in which 
the County of Riverside implemented this requirement. 
Under the County's policy the probable cause determi· 
nation was combined with the arraignment. Arraignments, 
under state law, must be conducted within two days of 
arrest. Weekends and holidays, however, were excluded 
from the two-day computation. Consequently, a person 
arrested late in the week could be held for as many as 
five days before receiving a probable cause hearing. Over 
the Thanksgiving holiday, a 7-day delay was possible. 
The Supreme Court wanted to provide states with 
some flexibility in complying with the Gerstein require-
ment, thereby permitting states to incorporate the proba-
ble cause determination into bail or initial appearance 
proceedings. "But flexibility has its limits; Gerstein is not 
a blank check. A State has no legitimate interest in 
detaining for extended periods individuals who have 
been arrested without probable cause." /d. at 1669. 
Because the lower courts had failed to agree on what 
constitutes a "prompt" hearing, the Supreme Court felt 
compelled to provide more specific guidance: "a jurisdic· 
tion that provides judicial determination of probable 
cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as general matter, 
comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. For 
this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from 
systemic challenges." /d. at 1670. The Court went on to 
state, however, that the 48-hour limit determined only the 
burden of proof. The burden rests on the defendant when 
the detention is less than 48 hours and rests on the 
'ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
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prosecution for detentions of m~~AB hours. The 
Court commented: 
This is not to say that the probable cause determina-
tion in a particular case passes constitutional muster 
simply because it is provided within 48 hours. Such a 
hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if the arrest-
ed individual can prove that his or her probable cause 
determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of 
unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of 
gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a 
delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individu-
al, or delay for delay's sake. /d. at 1670. 
A delay over 48 hours is presumptively invalid, shifting 
the burden to the prosecution to justify the delay. A bona 
fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstances 
might suffice; intervening weekends and delays to 
consolidate proceedings would not. A jurisdiction wish-
ing to combine procedures must do so within the 48-hour 
period. 
Seizure 
California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), presented 
the Court with the opportunity to decide whether a flee-
ing suspect is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when the police give chase. Two police 
officers in an unmarked car rounded a corner and began 
to drive toward a group youths. When the car approached, 
the youths began to flee. The officers became suspicious 
and pursued some of them, one officer in the car and the 
other on foot: Hodari threw away what appeared to be a 
small rock just before he was tackled by the officer. He 
was carrying a pager and $130 in cash. The "rock" 
turned out to be crack cocaine. 
The key issue was: When did the seizure occur? A 
California appellate court had held that Hodari had been 
"seized" when he saw the officer running toward him. 
Under this analysis, the crack would be the fruit of an 
illegal detention due to the lack of reasonable suspicion. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the seizure 
occurred after the crack was dropped. The majority did 
not believe that the text of the Fourth Amendment nor its 
underlying policy supported the lower court's interpretation. 
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The Court wrote: 
In sum, assuming that [the officer's] pursuit in the 
present case constituted a "show of authority" enjoin-
ing Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with 
that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled. 
The cocaine abandoned while he was running was in 
this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to 
exclude it was pro.Rerly denied. /d. at 1552. 
One 6ther aspe~tciH6!dari deserves comment. The 
State conceded that'fhe youths' flight did not amount to 
reason~DIRsuspicion.T~e Supreme Court accepted this 
conce~slbn for purpOS!i~iof deciding this case. In a foot-
note, ~bw~y~r,}l]e,meioWty question~d this point: 
Tha{ it wou'ld·be·~nreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, 
YO!J~:g:_lj;l"Efi'{£\'f.lt?.:sc::att~r in panic upon the mere sight-
ing offfre"p'oliee-is iietself-evident, and arguably 
contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 
28:i ('The wicked flee when no man puisueth'). We do 
not decide that point here, but rely entirely upon the 
State's concession. /d. at 1549 n.1. 
Seizure 
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991), also involved a 
"seizure" issue. This case involved two police officers 
who boarded a bus, picked out Bostick, and asked to see 
his ticket and identification. The officers were in uniform. 
They had, however, no reasonable suspicion to single 
out Bostick. After returning his identification, they 
explained that they were on the lookout for drugs and 
asked whether Bostick would consent to a search of his 
bag.TheJrialcourt found that Bostick voluntarily 
consented. Consequently, the critical issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the i 11itialcontact between 
Bostick and the police was a "seizure." If this encounter 
amounted to a seizure, it would have been illegal due to 
the lack of reasonable suspicion, and thus the consent 
would be tainted. 
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that when police 
mount a drug search on buses during scheduled stops 
and question boarded passengers without reasonable 
suspicion an impermissible seizure occurs. The U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected this analysis as inconsistent 
with its earlier cases. These cases had held that a 
seizure does not occur simply because the police 
approach a person and ask questions. As long as a 
reasonable person would feel free to leave, the encoun-
ter is consensual and reasonable suspicion is not 
required. Only when the police, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, have in some way restrained 
the person's liberty does a "seizure" occur. 
Bostick attempted to distinguish these cases because 
the encounter took place "in the cramped confines of a 
bus." He argued that such an encounter is more 
intimidating in this setting because the "police tower 
over a seated passenger and there is little room to move 
around." /d. at 2386. The Court remained unconvinced. 
As long as the passenger is not led by the police's 
conduct to believe that he is not free to leave, no seizure 
has occurred. The Court took pains to make two points. 
First, the officers had advised Bostick of his right to 
refuse to consent. Second, the officers never used or 
threatened to use their weapons. 
Significantly, the Court also pointed out that it had 
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"consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without 
more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 
justification needed for a detention or seizure." /d. at 238/ 
Automobile Searches 
The Court granted certiorari in California v. Acevedo, 
111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991), to "reexamine the law applicable tc 
a closed container in an automobile, a subject that has 
troubled courts and law enforcement officers since it wa: 
first considered in Chadwick." /d. at 1985. 
The police had seized a shipment of marijuana and 
then let a suspect take control of it and bring it to his 
apartment. Shortly thereafter another man arrived and le: 
with a blue knapsack. When he was stopped, marijuana 
was found in the knapsack. The defendant, Charles 
Acevedo, was the next person to enter the apartment. 
He left with a bag the size of the individually wrapped 
marijuana packages found in the shipment. He placed 
the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away. 
The police stopped the car, searched the trunk, and 
found marijuana when they opened the bag. 
These facts raised an issue that was bound to return tc 
the Supreme Court. The Court's prior cases, United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), had created a strange rule. 
If the police had probable cause to believe contraband 
was in an automobile, they could search the entire car 
without a warrant, including any container in the car. If, 
however, the police had probable cause that the contra-
band was in a container in a automobile, they could seizt 
the container but could not search it without a warrant. 
Not surprisingly, the Court eliminated this anomaly by 
dispensing with the warrant requirement for all contain-
ers foundinautomobiles,.providedthere is probable 
cause: "The police may search an automobile and the 
containers within it where they have probable cause to 
believe contraband or evidence is contained." /d. at 199· 
As the dissent points out, however, the new ruling still 
leaves an anomaly. The police must obtain a warrant if 
they seize a briefcase from a pedestrian, but no warrant 
is required if they wait until the pedestrian places the 
briefcase in a car and begins to drive away. 
Consent 
Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991), involved a 
defendant's consent to the search of an automobile 
during whichthe police found drugs in a closed contain-
er. A policeman was following the defendant's car 
because the policeman suspected drug activity. The 
defendant's car was stopped when he made a right turn 
without stopping at a red light. The officer told the defen 
dant that he thought drugs were in the car and that he 
wanted to search the car. He also informed the defendar 
that the defendant did not have to consent. The defen-
dant replied by saying that he had "nothing to hide" and 
the officer could search. During the search the officer 
found a folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard. He 
opened the bag and discovered a kilogram of cocaine. 
The Florida Court of Appeals ruled the search illegal 
because it went beyond the scope of the defendant's 
consent. According to that court, consent to a general 
search for narcotics does not extend to sealed containe1 
within the general area agreed to by the defendant. The 
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The touchstone of the 
Court's analysis was reasonableness. The scope of the 
search is generally defined by its object, and the defen-
dant consented to a search for drugs, which are typically 
concealed in containers. "We think that it was objectively 
reasonable for the police to conclude that the general 
consent to search respondent's car included consent to 
search containers within that car which might bear 
drugs." /d. at 1804. The Court held: "The Fourth Amend-
ment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is 
objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the 
scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a 
particular container within the car." /d. at 1803. 
The decision nevertheless does contain limiting 
language. The Court stated that consent to the search of 
a car trunk would not extend to a locked briefcase found 
inside the trunk. "It is very likely unreasonable to think 
that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, 
has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase 
within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a 
closed paper bag." /d. at 1804. In addition, a defendant 
can delimit the scope of the search on his own initiative. 
CONFESSIONS 
Miranda: Right to Counsel 
In Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), the 
defendant was apprehended in California for murder and 
other crimes committed in Mississippi. After his arrest, 
he was first interviewed by FBI agents. H13 received 
Miranda warnings, refused to sign a waiver form, and 
made some incriminatory statements. He told the agents 
to "Come back Monday when I have a lawyer present." 
/d. at 488. An attorney was appointed, and Minnick con-
sult~d with him. On the following Monday, a Mississippi 
shenff sought to interview Minnick. Minnick later testified 
that his jailers told him he had to meet with the sheriff. 
Again Miranda warnings were given, and again Minnick 
declined to sign a rights waiver form. Nevertheless, he 
went on to make extensive inculpatory comments. His 
comments in this last interview were admitted against 
him at trial, and he was convicted. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Minnick's Miranda 
argument. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.477 (1981), the 
Court had ruled that once a suspect asserts his right to 
counsel under Miranda, questioning must cease and a 
subsequent interrogation could not commence unless 
the suspect initiated the second contact with the police. 
The Edwards rule was designed to prevent the police 
from badgering a suspect into waiving his previously 
asserted Miranda rights. It also had the advantage of 
providing a clear and unequivocal guideline. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court had held that this 
requirement had been satisfied in Minnick's case 
because he had consulted with counsel before the rein-
terrogation. The Supreme Court rejected this reading of 
Edwards. The Court wrote: 
In our view, a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent 
cases demonstrates that we have interpreted the rule 
to bar police-initiated interrogation unless the accused 
has counsel with him at the time of questioning. What-
ever the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, 
we _now hold that when counsel is requested, interro-
gatiOn must cease, and officials may not reinitiate inter-
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rogation without counsel present, whether or not the 
accused has consulted with his attorney. /d. at 491. 
Miranda vs. Right to Counsel 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (1991), turned on 
the distinction between the right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment and the right to counsel under Miran-
da, a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination case. 
McNeil was arrested in Nebraska for a Wisconsin bank 
robbery. Two Milwaukee sheriffs were sent to retrieve 
him. After receiving Miranda warnings, McNeil refused to 
answer questions, but he did not request counsel. Once 
back in Milwaukee, McNeil was brought before a 
commissioner for an initial appearance on the bank 
robbery charge, at which time a public defender was 
appointed to represent him. 
A detective investigating an unrelated murder and 
burglary visited McNeil at the jail that evening. Miranda 
warnings were given and waived. McNeil did not deny 
knowledge of these crimes but merely said that he was 
not involved. Two days later the detective returned, McNeil 
again waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted his 
involvement in the murder and burglary. After checking 
out McNeil's story, the detective returned a third time. 
McNeil again waived his Miranda rights and made another 
incriminating statement. At trial tor the murder and 
burglary, he moved to suppress his three statements ~r_g_uing that his court appearance with an attorney o~ the 
m1t1al bank robbery charge constituted an invocation of 
his Miranda right to counsel for the other crimes. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. 
The Court's prior Sixth Amendment cases had held that 
on?e the right to counsel has attached, a subsequent 
wa1ver at a police-initiated custodial interview is ineftec-
ti_ve. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). Here, the 
nght to counsel for the bank robbery had attached at the 
initial appearance, and McNeil had not initiated the inter-
view at the jail. The Court ruled, however, that the "Sixth 
Amendment right ... is offense-specific. It cannot be 
invoked for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach 
until a prosecution is commenced, that is, 'at or after the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-
yvh~ther by v:'ay of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
1nd1ctment, mformation, or arraignment'." /d. at 2207. 
Consequently, McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel for_t~e murder-burglary charges had not yet attached. 
In add1t1on, he waived his Miranda Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel before giving each statement. McNeil's 
claim rested on a combination of the Sixth and Fifth 
Amendment rights, but the Court required a separate 
analysis of the two constitutional guarantees. 
Involuntary Confessions: Harmless Error 
In Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), the 
Court re_versed its long-st~nding rule that involuntary 
confessions '!'ere not subject to harmless error analysis. 
Under the pnor cases, the admissibility of such a confes-
sion resulted in automatic reversal of the conviction. 
Fulminante reported to the police that his 11-year-old 
stepdaughter was missing. Her body was discovered two 
days later. Fulminante became a suspect but charges 
were never filed. This occurred in 1982. He subsequently 
moved to New Jersey and was sent to prison for a later 
?B 4o1 cs 1W~ -· 
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firearms violation. While detained, another inmate, an 
FBI informant, learned about the Arizona killing. The 
informant told Fulminante that he could protect 
Fulminante from other inmates only if Fulminante told 
him about the killing. Fulminante admitted his involve-
ment in the stepdaughter's death. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the confession had 
been coerced. There had been a credible threat of 
physical violence against Fulminante because the other 
inmates had learned that he was a "child murderer." The 
critical issue involved the consequence of this finding. 
The Court had long held that a conviction based on an 
involuntary confession could not stand. This rule applied 
even if there was ample other evidence to support the 
conviction. A five-Justice majority scrapped this automat-
ic reversal rule. A conviction need not be reversed in this 
context if the prosecution can establish that the errone-
ously admitted confession was harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 
The Court considered grand jury practice in United 
States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 722 (1991). The 
issue involved a challenge to a subpoena duces tecum 
issued by a federal grand jury investigating the interstate 
transportation of obscene material. The subpoenas 
required the production of corporate records and numer-
ous videotapes shipped by three companies owned by 
Martin Rothstein. All three companies moved to quash 
the subpoenas on relevancy grounds. 
The Supreme Court focused on Federal Criminal Rule 
17(c};wFHcngoveths subpoenas duces tecum in federal 
practice. The rule authorizes the trial court to quash or 
modify asubpoena if "compliance would be unreasona-
ble or oppressive." The Court determined that "reasona-
bleness" differed according to context and the standards 
applicable to trial subpoenas do not apply to grand jury 
subpoenas. In particular the Court held that the stan-
dards of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), were 
inapplicable. Nixon had held that a party seeking produc-
tion of documents must make a reasonably specific 
request for information that would be both relevant and 
admissible at trial. 
The prosecution need not make such a showing when 
agrand jury subpoena is challenged. These subpoenas 
are "pr!3?Umed tobe reasonable" and the burden to 
demonstrate unreasonableness rests on the challenging 
party. This burden is substantial: 
[W]Ilere ... a subpoena is challenged on relevancy 
grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless 
the district court determines that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the category of materials the Government 
seeks will produce information relevant to the general 
subject of the grand jury's investigation. /d. at 728. 
The Court acknowledged that this standard was espe-
cially stringent for the recipient of the subpoena because 
there is no requirement that the recipient be apprised of 
the subject matter of the investigation. The Court 
suggested that the trial court could require the Govern-
ment to make an in camera disclosure of the subject 
matter of the investigation. This procedure would 
preserve grand jury secrecy and preclude the use of 
challenges as a discovery device. 
4 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
Standing 
In Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991), a white defen-
dant challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude black venirepersons from a jury in 
an aggravated murder prosecution. Citing Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the defendant raised Sixth 
Amendment Qury trial) and Fourteenth Amendment 
(equal protection) challenges to this conduct. 
The Court had long held that racial discrimination in 
the jury selection pfocess offended the Equal Protection 
Clause. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the 
Court for the first time considered the use of peremptory 
challenges as a device to exclude jurors because of their 
race. The Court rejected Swain's challenge, but indicated 
that the systematic exclusion of black persons through 
the use of peremptories over a period of time might 
establish an Equal Protection violation. This burden, 
however, was difficult to satisfy, and the Court revisited 
the issue in Batson. In that case the Court held that a 
defendant could raise an Equal Protection challenge to 
the use of peremptories at his own trial by showing that 
the prosecutor had used them for the purpose of exclud-
ing members of the defendant's race. Establishing 
systematic exclusion over a period of time, as suggested 
in Swain, was not required. The Court rested its decision 
on Equal Protection grounds. 
In a subsequent decision, Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 
474, 110 S.Ct. 803 (1990}, the defendant made a Sixth 
Amendment challenge, based on the "fair cross section" 
guarantee of the right to trial by jury. A majority of the 
Court ruled that the "fair cross section" requirement 
applied to the jury pool and not to the petit jury chosen 
frorfrtliat pool. Thus; pefremptory challenges could not 
be attacked on this ground. Five Justices, however, 
suggested that an Equal Protection challenge might be 
successful. Justice Kennedy, writing a concurring opin-
ion, indicated that he would side with the four dissenting 
Justices if a Fourteenth Amendment challenge had been 
raised: "I find it essential to make clear that if the claim 
here were based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause, it would have merit." /d. at 811. 
The principal problem with the Equal Protection argu-
ment raised in Powers concerned the issue of standing. 
Swain suggested and Batson held that the exclusion of 
jurors on a racial basis by means of peremptory 
challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. Batson 
a black man, had challenged the exclusion of other 
blacks from the jury. Powers, however, was a white defen 
dant challenging the exclusion of black jurors. The issue 
turned on whether a white defendant suffered any harm 
in this situation. The Court held that Powers had sutferec 
such a harm: 
The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon 
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole 
that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in 
accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The 
verdict will not be accepted or understood in these 
terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the 
outset. Upon these considerations, we find that a 
criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the 
prosecutor excludes jurors at his or her own trial on 
account of race. 111 S.Ct. at 1372. 
This analysis was also supported by a third-party stand-
ing argument, with the Court finally concluding "that a 
defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party 
equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prose-
cution because of their race." /d. at 1373. 
Civil Cases and Peremptories by the Defense 
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 111 
S.Ct. 2077 (1991), the Court extended Batson to civil liti-
gation. This case is important because it suggests the 
answer to another issue: Poes Batson apply to the defen-
dant's use of peremptory challenges? Several lower 
courts have answered "yes." See United States v. De 
Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1990). 
The principal issue is whether there is state action 
when the defendant strikes jurors on racial grounds, an 
issue also critical in analyzing whether Batson applies to 
civil litigation. The Court in Edmonson wrote: 
Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may 
be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury 
selection proceedings is to determine representation 
on a governmental body. Were it not for peremptory 
challenges, there would be no question that the entire 
process of determining who will serve mn the jury 
constitutes state act. The fact that the government 
delegates some portion of this power to private liti-
gants does not change the governmental character of 
the power exercised. 111 S.Ct. at 2086. 
This reasoning also would seem to apply to a criminal 
defendant's use of peremptories. In dissent Justice 
Scalia noted that the rationale of Edmonson would make 
Batson applicable to criminal defendants: "The effect of 
today's decision (which logically must apply to criminal 
prosecutions) will be to prevent the defendant from [race-
based strikes]- so that the minority defendant can no 
longer seek to prevent an all-white jury, or to seat as 
many jurors of his own race as possible." /d. at 2095. The 
Court subsequently granted certiorari on this issue. 
Georgia v. McCullum, 112 S.Ct. 370 (1991). 
Standard of Review 
In Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), the 
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike two 
Latinos from the jury panel. The defendant objected on 
Batson grounds. In response, the prosecutor explained 
that he feared that the two jurors would not be able to 
accept an interpreter's version of the testimony of 
Spanish-speaking witnesses. 
The Supreme Court, in a split decision, ruled that the 
prosecutor's conduct had not violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The Court set out a three-step procedure for 
analyzing Batson issues: (1) Initially, the defendant must 
make a prima facie showing of the racial basis for 
peremptory strikes. (2) Once this showing is made, the 
burden shifts to the prosecution who must offer a race-
neutral explanation for its conduct. (3) Finally, the court 
must determine whether the prosecution has satisfied its 
burden. The issue in Hernandez was whether the prose-
cution's explanation amounted to a valid race-neutral 
explanation under the second prong of the Batson test. 
The Court wrote: 
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis 
here means an explanation based on something other 
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than the race of the juror .... Unless a discriminatory 
intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the 
reason offered will be deemed race neutral. /d. at 1866. 
The defendant argued that Spanish-language ability 
was closely related to ethnicity, and thus the use of 
peremptories on this basis violated Equal Protection 
guarantees. The plurality opinion side-stepped this issue 
by pointing out that language alone was not the basis for 
the strike. The prosecutor explained that the two potential 
jurors hesitated in responding and their demeanor also 
caused him to question whether they would accept the 
official translation. Accordingly, the explanation was 
race-neutral: "As explained by the prosecutor, the 
challenges rested neither on the intention to exclude 
Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions 
about Latinos or bilinguals." Although the prosecutor's 
position "might well result in the disproportionate removal 
of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact 
does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause." /d. at 1867. The trial 
court found no discriminatory intent, and the Supreme 
Court would not disturb this finding because it was not 
"clearly erroneous." /d. at 1871. 
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY 
Voir Dire 
The defendant in Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899 
(1991), was charged with the murder of a woman in 
Prince William County, Virginia. At the time of the murder 
Mu'ium was out of prison on a work detail. The case 
generated substantial publicity. Eight of the twelve 
venirepersons eventually sworn as jurors had read or 
heard something about the case. They also stated that 
they had formed no opinion and would consider only the 
evidence admitted at trial. 
Mu'min was convicted, sentenced to death, and appealed. 
He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury and his right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment were violated because the trial judge 
refused to question the jurors about the specific content 
of the news reports to which they had been exposed. 
The defendant had initially asked for a change of 
venue because of the pretrial publicity, which included 
numerous articles about the crime and the defendant, 
including the fact that he had been sentenced to prison 
for an earlier murder. The trial court deferred ruling on 
this motion until after it attempted to seat a jury. The 
defense next submitted 64 proposed voir dire questions 
and a motion for individual voir dire. The court rejected 
both the questions and the motion. Instead, the jurors 
who had indicated that they had heard of the case were 
asked if they could keep an open mind and wait until all 
the evidence had been introduced before reaching a 
fixed opinion. 
The Supreme Court found nothing wrong with this 
procedure. A trial court's failure to ask questions on voir 
dire violates the Constitution only if it is fundamentally 
unfair. Under the constitutional standard, the issue "is 
not whether the community remembered the case, but 
whether the jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they 
could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant." 
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984). The Court 
believed that the trial court's conduct on voir dire 
satisfied this standard. Further specific questions were 
not required, at least not on this record. 
Gag Rules on Defense Attorneys 
Gentile v. State Bar,of Nevada, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991), 
involved a defense attorney who was disciplined for hold-
ing a press conference. The press conference was held 
the day after his client was indicted, and Gentile asserted 
that his client was a scapegoat and that the crime had 
been committed by police officers. Six months after the 
press conference, the client was tried and acquitted. 
Thereafter, the State Bar found that Gentile's conduct at 
the press conference violated a court rule on pretrial 
publicity, which is almost identical to ABA Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.6. The Rule prohibited an attorney 
from making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should have known that it will have a substantial likelihood 
of material prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 
Gentile argued that the rule violated his First Amendment 
and Due Process rights. 
The case turned on the due process issue. Gentile 
argued that the rule was void for vagueness. The Rule 
recognized an exception; an attorney may "state without 
elaboration ... the general nature of the ... defense." 
According to the Court, the terms "general" and "elabo-
ration" were "both classic terms of degree." 
In the context before us, these terms have no settled 
usage or traditionof interpretation. The lawyer has no 
priociplefordetermining when his remarks pass from 
the safe harbor of the general to the forbidden sea of 
the elaborated. /d. at 2731. 
The Rule therefore provided insufficient notice of what 
was proscribed, a traditional"void-for-vagueness" 
concern. In addition, a vague provision raises the possi-
bility of discriminatory enforcement. The Court believed 
that this was a real possibility, a danger which is of 
"particular relevance when one of the classes most 
affected by the regulation is the criminal defense bar, 
which has the professional mission to challenge actions 
of the State." !d. at 2732. 
The First Amendment issue produced a different 
majority. Justice O'Connor, who joined in the due proc-
ess analysis with fourother Justices, sided with a differ-
ent majority on the freedom of speech issue. This 
majority, led by the Chief Justice, held that attorneys' 
First Amendment rights were limited by their participa-
tion in the judicial process. These five Justices believed 
that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in 
pending cases may be regulated under a less 
demanding standard than that established for regulation 
of the press .... " /d. at 2744. In particular, a "substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice" standard could be used 
in lieu of the more exacting "clear and present danger" 
standard. 
Because Gentile's statement was made six months 
before trial and the jury was to be selected from a popula-
tion in excess of 600,000 persons, the Court found that 
the press conference could not have prejudiced the jury 
selection process. Indeed, the record showed that police 
and prosecutor comments on the investigation leading 
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up to the indictment were far more pervasive. 
DEFENSE EVIDENCE: RAPE SHIELD LAWS 
The defendant in Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S.Ct. 1743 
(1991), was charged with rape. A "rape shield" statute 
required a rape defendant to give the prosecution 10-day 
notice of his intention to present evidence of an alleged 
rape victim's past sexual conduct. Lucas failed to comply 
with the notice requirement, and the trial court refused to 
allow such evidence at trial. On appeal, a Michigan 
appellate court ruled that the exclusion of defense 
evidence-was"a-per seviolation of the accused's Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
Any statute that operates to prevent an accused from 
presenting relevant evidence implicates the Sixth 
Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is 
not without limit. Indeed, in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 
(1988), the Court had ruled that under some circum-
stances a trial court could exclude defense evidence as a 
sanction for the defendant's failure to comply with prose-
cution discovery requests. Taylor did not hold that preclu-
sion of defense evidence could always be justified, only 
that preclusion was not per se unconstitutional. 
The Court applied the same reasoning in Lucas: "The 
notice-and-hearing requirement serves legitimate state 
interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and 
undue delay. Failure to comply with this requirement may 
in some cases justify even the severe sanction of preclu-
sion." /d. at 1748. Consequently, the Court rejected the 
view that preclusion of defense evidence was a per se 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court refused to 
decide whether preclusion could be justified on the facts 
of this case. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the 
lower court to.determine this issue. 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
The defendant in Harrnelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 
(1991), was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole for possessing over 1.5 
pounds of cocaine. A first-time offender, Harmelin 
challenged his sentence as violative of the Eighth 
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment. He argued that the sentence was signifi-
cantly disproportionate to the crime committed and that 
its mandatory imposition precluded the sentencing court 
from consideringt_he circumstances of the crime or of the 
criminal. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions. 
The Court's most recent decision on the application of 
the Eighth Amendment in rioncapital cases was Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Court in Solem struck 
down a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility 
of parole because it was grossly disproportionate to the 
crime charged and underlying recidivism statute upon 
which the sentence was based. 
In Harme/in a plurality of the Court took the position 
that "the Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it 
forbids only extreme sentences that are " 'grossly 
disproportionate' to the crime." 111 S.Ct. at 2705. Like 
Solem, Harmelin received the second most severe penal-
ty permitted by law. His crime, however, was far more 
serious than the relatively minor nonviolent offenses 
committed by Solem. 
